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Resumen: Este artículo trata sobre las diferencias y coincidencias entre los 
populismos en Europa y el Trumpismo. Evalúa, asimismo, tres elementos 
que son percibidos generalmente como explicación de acontecimientos re-
cientes, como el Brexit y la elección de Donald Trump: un desencanto con 
la democracia, la desigualdad económica y una reacción cultural. Mientras 
el trumpismo incluye peculiaridades típicamente americanas, refleja una 
profunda crisis social que afecta a todas las democracias occidentales. Esta 
crisis está alimentada por una cultura del miedo, un síndrome revanchista 
y una creciente banalización de la violencia.
Abstract: This paper addresses the similarities and differences between 
forms of populism in Europe and Trumpism. It evaluates three factors that 
are commonly perceived as explaining recent events, such as Brexit and 
the election of election of Donald Trump: a democratic disenchantment; 
economic inequality; and a cultural backlash. While Trumpism includes 
typically American peculiarities, it reflects a deep societal crisis that affects 
all Western democracies. This crisis is fueled by a culture of fear, a revanchist 
syndrome, and an increasing banality of violence.
What’s going on? This is definitely the first and foremost question raised by either 
supporters of, or opponents to, the changes Western democracies now face. For 
advocates of Brexit or Trump supporters, we are entering into a new era. It is one 
characterized by the collapse of a corrupted establishment; the decline of mainstream 
parties disconnected from popular concerns; and increasing push towards equity 
for the “left-behinds” of neoliberal globalization. They believe that some restitution is 
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part of the overdue recognition of their 
legitimate grievances as the insecure 
strata of society. 
Opponents frame the critical issues in a 
differing way. For them it is to understand 
“how did we get into this mess?”1 . 
That “mess” includes the improved 
electoral fortune of populist leaders; the 
development of savage partisan divisions; 
common and increasingly aggressive 
affronts to minimal decency; the growth 
of ethno-religious prejudice; and the 
normalization of racial conservatism.
For European commentators, there were 
“echoes of Trumpism in the nationalist 
parties of Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Greece as well as France.” Common to all of 
them is “a dissatisfaction with the status quo, 
the sense that middle-class and working class 
have been neglected by the existing political 
establishment, a feeling that politicians 
aren’t honest with voters”2. Trump himself 
was often compared to authoritarian leaders 
(such as Putin and Erdogan), and populist 
activists like Geert Wilder in the Netherlands, 
Marine Le Pen in France, and Frauke Petry 
in Germany. “Now that Trump is coming,” 
Brian O’Connor wrote in Time, “we must 
look at this election in the broader context of 
Western populism – a trend that shows no 
sign in true direction but also shows no signs 
of weakening anytime soon”3. Marine Le 
1. McAdam, D. and Kloos, K. (2014) Deeply Di-
vided. Racial Politics and Social Movements in 
Postwar America, Oxford, N.Y., Oxford Univer-
sity Press, p. 3.
2. Ketty, K. (2016) “Europe Hates Trump. Does 
it Matter?”, BBC, March 4. Available at http://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35702584. 
Access May 8, 2017.
3. O’Connor, B. (2016) “President Trump and 
Brexit Are Only the Start”, Time, November 11. 
Available at http://time.com/4566638/trump-
brexit-france-germany/. Access May 8, 2017.
Pen, the self-proclaimed “Madame Frexit”, 
tweeted her congratulations to President 
Trump who characterized himself “Mr Brexit 
plus, plus” and tweeted that she was the 
“strongest candidate” in the run up to the 
French presidential election. Nigel Farage, 
the UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader 
who strongly supported the exit from the EU, 
celebrated Trump’s victory as a “win double”. 
President Trump, reciprocally, made Farage 
“a close but unofficial adviser” in the 
immediate aftermath of his inauguration.
One American observer noted that both 
the Brexit campaign and the Trump cam-
paign were “boiled with populist anger, 
fear-mongering by politicians, hostility 
towards distant political elites and resur-
gent nationalism”4. In The Washington 
Post, Chris Cillizza emphasized the “re-
markable parallels between the Brexit 
vote and the rise of Donald Trump”5. He 
listed major similarities between the two 
campaigns, such as the vehemence of 
anti-immigrant feelings, distrust for ins-
titutions, and a disdain for the presiding 
political elites. USA Today reported that 
Trump himself stressed a “big parallel…
People want their country back. Britons 
took their country back, just like we will 
take America back”6. 
4. Collinson, S. (2016) “Trump on Brexit: Amer-
ica Is Next”, CNN, June 25. Available at http://
www.cnn.com/2016/06/24/politics/us-election-
brexit-donald-trump-hillary-clinton/. 
Access May 8, 2017.
5. Cillizza, C. (2016) “The Remarkable Parallels 
Between the Brexit Vote and the Rise of Donald 
Trump”, The Washington Post, June 24. Avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2016/06/24/the-remarkable-parallels-
between-the-brexit-vote-and-the-rise-of-donald-
trump/?utm_term=.69f4949116f4. Access May 
8, 2017.
6. Onyango-Omara, J. (2016) “Parallels Run 
Strong With Shocking Trump U.S. victory 
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1. What’s supposedly going on?
From a macro-perspective, three 
interrelated series of factors are key. 
The first focuses on political factors and 
relates to a democratic disenchantment, 
of which there are several elements. 
A substantial body of research has 
documented the strong decline in 
institutional trust, a decrease in political 
participation, the rejection of mainstream 
political establishment, and the toxic 
impact of ideological polarization7. David 
Van Reybrouck, a Belgium intellectual, 
suggested that the loss of confidence 
in politicians was a manifestation of the 
“Democratic Fatigue Syndrome”8.
Surveys substantiate this perspective. The 
share of the vote for populist, authorita-
rian parliamentary parties in Europe has 
increased by an average of 50 percent 
over the past two decades. In contrast, 
the number of people who consider it “es-
sential” to live in a democracy has sharply 
declined, today constituting 32 per cent 
of those born after 1980 according to the 
and Brexit”, USA Today, November 9. Avail-
able at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
world/2016/11/09/donald-trump-president-brex-
it-united-kingdom/93540450/. Access May 8, 
2017. See also Zakaria, F. (1997) “The Rise of Il-
liberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, November/
December. Available at https://www.foreignaf-
fairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-de-
mocracy. Access May 8, 2017.
7. Stoker, G. (2016) “Explaining Political Disen-
chantment: Finding Pathways to Democratic Re-
newal”, The Political Quarterly 77 (2): 184-194; 
Parker, C. and Barreto, M. (2013) Change They 
Can’t Believe in: The Tea Party and Reactionary 
Politics in Contemporary America, Princeton, 
N.J, Princeton University Press.
8. Van Reybrouk, D. (2016) Against Election: The 
Case for Democracy, London, Random House.
World Values Survey9. In its 2017 report, 
fittingly entitled “Trust In Crisis,” the Edel-
man Trust Barometer found that only 41 
percent of respondents in 28 countries 
said they trusted their government10. And 
according to a 2014 Eurobarometer sur-
vey, 72 percent of Europeans distrusted 
their government, while 82 percent dis-
trusted their national political parties11. 
This trend extends to the United States 
where faith in institutions has reached his-
toric lows. According to a Gallup opinion 
poll survey, only 32 percent of respon-
dents expressed confidence in 14 major 
U.S. institutions in 2016 – down from 38 
percent in 2007. The data on confidence 
in Congress is even more stunning: de-
clining from 19 percent to nine percent 
during the same period12. By 2017, more 
than 20 percent of U.S. adults cited dis-
satisfaction with the government and po-
litical leadership as the most important 
problem facing the country13.
The second set of factors relate to 
economic inequality. This perspective 
9.  Foa, R. S. and Mounk, Y. (2016) “The Demo-
cratic Disconnect”, Journal of Democracy, 27 
(3), pp. 6-18.
10. Available at http://www.edelman.com/execu-
tive-summary/. Access May 9, 2017.
11. Standard Eurobarometer (2014), Public Opin-
ion in the European Union, 81, Spring. Available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publico-
pinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_publ_en.pdf. Ac-
cess May 9, 2017.
12. Available at http://www.gallup.com/
poll/192581/americans-confidence-institutions-
stays-low.aspx. Access May 9, 2017.
13. Swift, A. (2017) “Americans Name Dissat-
isfaction With Government as Top Problem”, 
Gallup, April 5. Available at http://www.gallup.
com/poll/208526/adults-name-government-
dissatisfaction-important-problem.aspx?g_
source=Politics&g_medium=newsfeed&g_
campaign=tiles. Access May 9, 2017.
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emphasizes the consequences of 
globalization on post-industrial econo-
mies. They include four elements: the 
decline of manufacturing industry, the 
erosion of organized labor, an increasing 
competition over scarce social resources 
(such as welfare benefits and educational 
opportunities), and the dramatic socio-
economic inequalities enhanced by neo-
liberal austerity policies14. These trends 
collectively fuel resentment among the 
so-called “losers of globalization.” They 
become susceptible to exploitative anti-
establishment, nativist, and xenophobic 
scare-mongering by populists who 
blame ‘Them’ for stripping prosperity, 
job opportunities, and public services 
from ‘Us’15. This narrative has taken two 
forms in the United States. On the Left, 
the economic inequality argument has 
been foundational to the anti-Wall Street 
narrative embedded in the campaign of 
the democratic presidential candidate 
Bernie Sanders. On the Right, in its 
nativist formulation, it has driven Trump’s 
supporters who praise the restoration of 
a past golden age through restrictions to 
NAFTA, the rejection of the Paris Climate 
Agreement, American withdrawal from 
the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership, 
and the avid endorsement of anti-migrant 
measures. In Europe, concerns about the 
“dark sides” of globalization have catalyzed 
support for Eurosceptic parties (such 
as UKIP in Great Britain, the Freedom 
Party in Austria and Golden Dawn in 
14. Piketty, T. (2014) Capital, Cambridge, MA, 
Bellnap Press; Hacker, J. (2006) The Great Risk 
Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the De-
cline of the American Dream, NY, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
15. Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2016) “Trump, 
Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic 
Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash”, Faculty Re-
search Working Paper, Harvard Kennedy School.
Greece) and left-wing populist groups 
(such as PODEMOS in Spain, and Syriza 
in Greece). Charles Hankla, professor at 
Georgia University State, argued that the 
Brexit vote and Trump’s election reflected 
a global rejection of liberal ideals. These 
two events, he wrote, indicated that 
“a significant number of Britons and 
Americans, especially among the native-
born working class, have negative feelings 
about immigration, free markets and social 
change more generally”16.
The third approach to explaining the crisis 
of liberal democracies focuses on a cultural 
backlash. Ronald Ingelhart and Pippa 
Norris maintain that this perspective builds 
on the “silent revolution” theory “which 
holds that the shift toward post-materialist 
values, such as cosmopolitanism and 
multiculturalism” triggers a “counter-
revolutionary retro backlash, especially 
among the older generation, white men, 
and less educated sectors, who sense 
decline and actively reject the rising tide of 
progressive values”17. Active participants 
in this cultural backlash include the Tea 
Party Movement in the United States, as 
well as other political and religious groups 
combating key components of “identity 
liberalism” – such as gender and racial 
equality, and equal rights for the LGBT 
community. Populist movements in Europe 
exploit a sense of cultural insecurity by 
raising the specter of the Islamization of 
the continent, denouncing the decline of 
national identity, and rejecting progressive 
16. Hankla, C. (2016) “Intolerance on the March: 
Do Brexit and Trump Point to Global Rejection 
of Liberal Ideals?”, The Conversation, June 28. 
Available at https://theconversation.com/intoler-
ance-on-the-march-do-brexit-and-trump-point-
to-global-rejection-of-liberal-ideals-61632. 
Access May 8, 2017.
17.  Ibid, p. 3.
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changes (such as the legalization of 
same-sex marriage). 
2. Is Trumpism exceptional?
Notable comparable trends on both 
sides of the Atlantic inevitably leads to 
the suggestion that they are caused by 
similar factors – whether they are political, 
economic cultural or a combination of two 
or more. But does it follow that the same 
effects are produced by the same causes? 
In the wake of Brexit and the rise of Trump, 
many observers expressed concerns about a 
populist spillover effect in Europe from these 
two events. Yet, not all populist European 
leaders nor their parties benefitted from a 
“Trump effect.” Far-right candidate Geert 
Wilders’ campaign fell short of expectations 
in the Dutch elections in March 2017. His 
Freedom Party (PVV) lost by a significant 
margin, being overtaken by the ruling center-
right Party for Freedom and Democracy 
(VVD). In France, Marine Le Pen lost the 
second round of the presidential election 
in May 2017 despite her intense anti-
immigrant campaign, longstanding double-
digit unemployment, and a series of terrorist 
attacks (which killed more than 230 people 
in 2015-16). Furthermore, the GERB, a pro-
European center-right party won the election 
in Bulgaria over anti-EU/anti-migrant 
candidates while UKIP’s share of the vote 
dramatically declined at both the local and 
national levels in Britain. During the general 
election if June 2017, the Conservative 
Party did not benefit from a positive “Brexit 
effect”; instead, the Conservatives won by a 
very small margin and lost 13 seats.
These examples lend credence to the claim 
that Trumpism may indeed be “exceptional.” 
If so, a problem remains in defining the most 
relevant components of this exceptionalism. 
Scholars and political analysts have focused 
on four possible factors.  
The first –and most individualized– relates 
to peculiarities of the current leadership. 
American populist nativism is as old as the 
United States itself – from Benjamin Franklin 
complaining about the “Palatine Boors” 
who were trying to Germanize Pennsylvania 
to the Know Nothing movement and the 
Order of the Star-Spangled Banner whose 
motto in the mid-19th century was “America 
for Americans”18. Indeed, key components 
of “Trumpism” have been exploited by 
previous political leaders who did not reach 
the Oval Office over the last five decades 
– such as Pat Buchanan and George 
Wallace. Other presidential contenders had 
a business background but also failed – 
such as William Randolph Hearst, Henry 
Ford, and Ross Perot. 
Trump, by contrast, successfully combines 
different US traditions: anti-intellectualism, 
nativist populism, and racial conservatism, 
combined with a long-standing distrust 
of government and grassroots contempt 
for the political correctness of the 
liberal establishment. He can thus be 
characterized as a “non-identified political” 
Janus figure who combines an insurgent 
mystic appeal in his fight against the corrupt 
establishment with the iconic American 
myth of the “self-made billionaire.” As Peter 
Beinart wrote in The Atlantic, Trump wants 
to “make America exceptional again” by 
promoting his own “exceptionalist story” – 
a narrative emphasizing on US sovereignty, 
nationhood, and the protection of US 
cultural values”19. 
18. Chebel d’Appollonia, A. (2012) Frontiers of 
Fear: Immigration and Insecurity in the United 
States and Europe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
19. Beinart, P. (2017) “How Trump Wants to 
Make America Exceptional Again”, The Atlantic, 
February. Available at https://www.theatlantic.
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A second approach to explaining Trump 
exceptionalism relates to the idiosyncrasies 
of party strategies and the US electoral 
system. Trump’s electoral victory may have 
surprised scholars and political pundits. 
But it can be understood as the culmination 
of a long-term, partisan evolution. The GOP 
began its strategic rightward shift under 
Nixon’s ‘Southern strategy” in order to 
capture George Wallace’s electoral support. 
It was later reinforced by Ronald Reagan 
who also energized racial conservatives, and 
firmly embedded the Christian right in the 
GOP with a focus on abortion, cultural wars 
and the use of drugs as electoral issues. 
Conversely, the Democratic Party meanwhile 
rebranded its platform under pressure from 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s, 
and the New Left of the 1970s. “Playing to 
the base” was seen as strategically more 
important, according to Doug McAdam and 
Karina Kloos, than courting the “median 
voter” on both sides20. This trend towards 
partisan polarization increased during the 
Clinton administration, and peaked during 
the Obama administration. The Tea Party 
movement accelerated the GOP’s rightward 
shift. Its major agenda consisted of ousting 
Obama, repealing the Affordable Care Act, 
reducing taxes, downsizing the federal 
government, and vehemently opposing 
progressive regulations21. Conversely, 
Democrats moved leftward, increasingly 
invoking the strategy and rhetoric of diversity 
by appealing to minorities of all stripes to 
vote for them. 
com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-trump-wants-
to-make-america-exceptional-again/515406/. 
Access May 12, 2017.
20. McAdam, D. and Kloos, K. (2014) Deeply 
Divided. Racial Politics and Social Movements 
in Postwar America, op. cit, p. 9.
21. Skocpol, T. and Williamson, V. (2012) The 
Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Con-
servatism, New York, Oxford University Press.
Cumulatively, the 2016 presidential 
campaign resembled a wrestling match 
organized by peculiar electoral rules (such 
as the super-PACs, and the electoral 
college) in a contest characterized by 
intense political animosity. About 58 
percent of Republicans had a very 
unfavorable impression of the Democratic 
Party in 2016, up from just 32 percent 
in 2008 and 46 percent in 2014. Highly 
negative views of the GOP among Democrats 
have similarly escalated: from 37 percent 
in 2008 to 43 percent in 2014 and 55 
percent in 201622. Such an intense political 
polarization helped Trump to take control 
of the GOP, and to secure the support 
of his voters. Although only 38 percent 
of Americans had a favorable opinion of 
Trump in November 2017, 82 percent of 
Republicans still supported him23. 
A third recent approach has focused on 
public opinion, notably the grievances of 
some white Americans - and their hostility 
to minority groups. Trump’s rhetoric during 
the presidential campaign combined nativist 
arguments (such the priority given to native 
workers over immigrants for employment 
and social benefits) and xenophobic 
fear tactics – conflating the notions of 
“terrorist” (against Muslims) and “criminal” 
(against Hispanics). Trump voters strongly 
subscribed to this rhetoric. A public opinion 
poll conducted by the Pew Research 
Center in November 2016 found that 79 
percent of Trump voters believed that illegal 
22. Pew Research Center (2016) “Partisanship 
and Political animosity in 2016”, US Politics 
& Policy. Available at http://www.people-press.
org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-ani-
mosity-in-2016/. Access May 23, 2017.
23. Gallup Opinion Poll Survey. Available at 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/203198/presidenti-
al-approval-ratings-donald-trump.aspx. Access 
November 14, 2014. 
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immigration was a “very big” problem in 
the country while only 20 percent of Clinton 
voters expressed such a belief. Since then, 
studies measuring the respective impact of 
intolerant attitudes towards immigrants and 
economic insecurity have illustrated that 
xenophobia –combined with conservative 
values– was the main predictor of those who 
for Trump. Trump performed best among 
Republicans who score highest in white 
ethnocentrism, anti-immigrant attitudes, 
racial resentment, fear of Muslims, and 
ethno-racial intolerance.
The fourth approach focuses on America’s 
unique and core relationship to racism. 
The disparity in the views of Clinton and 
Trump supporters about the prevalence of 
racism and its foundational role in defining 
American social and economic relations is 
remarkable. Various exit polls confirmed 
that white non-Hispanic voters preferred 
Trump over Clinton by 21 points. In that 
context, racism was viewed as a major 
problem by 53 percent of Clinton voters 
but by only 21 percent of Trump voters24. 
Much has been made about the fact that 
Trump won an overwhelming share (67 
percent compared with just 28 percent 
who supported Clinton) among whites 
without a college degree. But, reinforcing 
the significance of race, Trump also got 
more support from whites with a college 
degree graduates than Clinton (49 and 45 
percent respectively)25. 
24. Pew Research Center (2016) A Divided and 
Pessimistic Electorate, November 10. Available 
at http://www.people-press.org/2016/11/10/a-
divided-and-pessimistic-electorate/. Access De-
cember 12, 2016.
25. Pew Research Center (2016) Behind Trump’s 
Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education, 
November 9. Available at http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-
victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/. 
Access November 12, 2016.
Michael Tesler, in his book Post-Racial 
or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the 
Obama Era, provided evidence that racial 
attitudes have increasingly structured 
public opinion about immigration, as well 
as perceptions of economic conditions. 
Notably, data from the Cooperative 
Campaign Analysis Project (from 2008 
and 2012) showed that economic anxiety 
was not causing racism; rather, racial 
resentment was driving economic anxiety26. 
And in their analysis of the American 
National Election Study’ 2016 Pilot Study, 
Michael Tesler and John Sides argue that 
both white racial identity and beliefs that 
whites suffer from discrimination were 
powerful predictors of support for Trump27.
In this context, it is reasonable to assume 
that the core support for Trump comes 
from white, blue-collar manufacturing (or 
ex-manufacturing) voters who subscribe 
to a politicized nativism and ethno-racial 
nationalism. Trump was indeed portrayed 
as the candidate of the poor white 
working-class. Among his supporters, 
63 percent said that job opportunities 
26. Tesler, M. (2016) Post-Racial or Most-Ra-
cial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era, Chi-
cago, Chicago University Press. See also (2016) 
“Economic Anxiety isn’t Driving Racial Resent-
ment. Racial Resentment Is Driving Economic 
Anxiety”, The Washington Post, August 22. 
Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/22/economic-
anxiety-isnt-driving-racial-resentment-racial-
resentment-is-driving-economic-anxiety/?utm_
term=.df9955bda622. Access August 25, 2016.
27. Tesler, M. and Sides, J. (2016) “How Politi-
cal Science Helps Explain the Rise of Trump: 
The Role of White Identity and Grievances”, The 
Washington Post, March 3. Available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/
wp/2016/03/03/how-political-science-helps-
explain-the-rise-of-trump-the-role-of-white-
identity-and-grievances/?tid=a_inl&utm_
term=.6eab9db6f24b. Access April 2, 2016. 
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for working-class Americans were a 
“very big” problem in the country. There 
is evidence that supporters of Trump 
are indeed white, more likely to work in 
blue-collar occupations, and less likely 
to have a college degree than voters who 
supported Clinton. Nevertheless, when 
compared to the general population, they 
have higher-than-average income, are 60 
percent more likely to be self-employed, 
and live in communities with little 
manufacturing activities and high levels of 
racial homogeneity. Trump was therefore 
elected by voters having relatively high 
incomes –sharing nothing in common 
with the working class– except a strong 
sense of economic insecurity28. 
Trump exceptionalism admittedly relates 
to white ethnocentrism and racism. A 
survey conducted by PRRI among white 
working-class Trump voters, for example, 
showed that fears about immigrants and 
cultural displacement (such as the feeling 
of “being stranger in their own land”) 
were among the more powerful factors 
motivating Trump supporters. About 68 
percent of respondents said “the U.S. is in 
danger of losing its culture and identity;” 
62 percent believed that immigrants 
threaten American culture; and 52 
percent agreed that discrimination against 
whites has become a “big problem” in 
recent years29.
28. Silver, N. (2016) “The Mythology of Trump’s 
Working Class’ Support”, Politics. Available at 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-mytholo-
gy-of-trumps-working-class-support/. 
Access May 23, 2017.
29. Cox, D. et al. (2017) “Beyond Economics: 
Fears of Cultural Displacement Pushed the White 
Working Class to Trump”, PPRI/The Atlantic. 
Available at https://www.prri.org/research/white-
working-class-attitudes-economy-trade-immigra-
tion-election-donald-trump/. Access May 12, 2017.
There are, however, puzzling trends that 
suggest that racial prejudice is only one 
subcomponent of a broader phenomenon. 
It is worth noticing, for example, that 
Obama won a significant number of votes 
among racially prejudiced whites in 2008 
and 2012. About one quarter of whites, 
for example, who did not even think 
that blacks and whites should date each 
other supported Obama for president30. 
In aggregate, whites preferred Trump 
over Clinton (58 percent to 37 percent). 
Trump, however, fared little better among 
blacks and Hispanics than Mitt Romney 
had in 2012. No pre-election polls 
suggested that Trump would get as high 
as the 8 percent of black voting support 
–mostly conservative evangelicals– he 
received. Clinton, in contrast, lost one 
million black voters. So the assumption 
that political polarization involves only 
white voters against minority voters is 
misleading. Data on perceptions of racism 
provide significant evidence of anti-black 
prejudice among whites, and a widespread 
feeling among African Americans that 
they are discriminated against by whites 
on a racial. But, interestingly, about 37 
percent of Americans believe that most 
black Americans are more racist than 
whites and Hispanics. And even among 
30. Tesler, M. (2016) “Obama Won Lots of Votes 
From Racially Prejudiced Whites (And Some of 
Them Supported Trump)”, The Washington Post, 
December 7. Available at https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/07/
obama-won-lots-of-votes-from-racially-prej-
udiced-whites-and-some-of-them-supported-
trump/?utm_term=.f1e988212db5. Access De-
cember 8, 2016. See also Popkin, S. and Rivers, 
D. (2016) “The Unmaking of President McCain,” 
The Economist/YouGov/Polimetrix. Available at 
http://www.pollster.com/blogs/Popkin%20Riv-
ers%20Campaign%20Analysis%2011-04%20
w%20graphs.pdf. Access December 9, 2016.
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African Americans, 31 percent think that 
most blacks are racists31.
Party affiliation actually divided within 
racial groups: for example, 53 percent 
of Hispanic Republicans believe that 
Trump will be a good or great president. 
By comparison, 58 percent of Hispanic 
Democrats believe that Trump will be a poor 
or terrible president32. Furthermore, the 
relationship between “being a member of 
a migrant minority” and “having a positive 
view of immigrants” is more complex 
than might be expected. Hispanics, for 
example, are more likely than whites 
or blacks to believe that immigrants are 
make a positive contribution to American 
society (61 percent, 41 percent, and 44 
percent respectively). Twenty percent of 
Hispanics, however, have negative views 
of the impact of immigrants on the United 
States. Only 39 percent of Hispanics 
have a positive view of Latin American 
immigrants, and 48 percent believe that 
the U.S. government should give priority 
to highly educated immigrants – despite 
the fact that Hispanic immigrants are less 
educated than other groups. Among third 
generation Latinos, one-third (32 percent) 
believe that the impact of unauthorized 
immigration on Hispanics living in the 
U.S. is negative33. These and many other 
31. Rasmussen Reports (2013) “More Americans 
View Blacks As Racist than Whites and Hispan-
ics”. Available at http://www.rasmussenreports.
com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/
july_2013/more_americans_view_blacks_as_rac-
ist_than_whites_hispanics. Access May 29, 2017. 
32.  Pew Research Center (2017) “Latinos and 
the New trump Administration”, Hispanic 
Trends. Available at http://www.pewhispanic.
org/2017/02/23/latinos-and-the-new-trump-ad-
ministration/. Access May 23, 2017.
33. Pew Research Center (2015) “US Public Has 
Mixed Views of Immigrants and Immigration”, 
Hispanic Trends. Available at http://www.pe-
examples of complexity, suggests that the 
relationship between racism and other 
forms of prejudice need to be clarified.
3. What’s actually going on?
These countervailing views confirm 
that, although the “whitebacklash” is 
significant, it is crucial to incorporate 
other explanatory factors into a broader 
perspective. These factors are actually 
symptoms of a deeper societal crisis on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Three inter-
related aspects of this crisis deserve 
particular attention: First, a widespread 
culture of fear which fuels and is fueled 
by conflicting group relations; second, a 
revanchist syndrome affecting politics, 
policies and social relations; and third, a 
subsequent banality of violence involving 
both actual and symbolic forms of adversity. 
These trends take place in a context 
characterized by a transition to diversity, 
a process that is deeply confrontational 
to, and rapidly transformative of the social 
fabric of Western democracies.
The Culture of Fear. The novelty of the 
present situation is only partially explained 
by the persistence of prejudice among 
all groups – as defined largely by their 
political affiliation, socio-economic status, 
and ethno-racial identity. It is also the 
product of a combination of an expanding 
repertoire of perceived threats and an 
extremely negative stereotypical process. 
These trends have two effects on the 
diffusion of a culture of fear: First, the 
category of the threatening “others” has 
been broadened. It today includes not 
only foreigners and ethno-racial minorities 
whispanic.org/2015/09/28/chapter-4-u-s-public-
has-mixed-views-of-immigrants-and-immigra-
tion/. Access November 3, 2016.
Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X
198
but also various in-groups who compete in 
the defense of their actual and symbolic 
position in Western societies. The “depiction 
of entire categories of people as innately 
dangerous” constitutes these groups’ raison 
d’être34. Muslims, for example, are negatively 
perceived by 43 percent of Europeans. 
Many Europeans (59 percent) also believe 
that refugees will increase the likelihood of 
terrorism in their country. It is worth noticing 
that these negative perceptions are not a 
linear function of the actual size of migrant 
groups, nor they are sustained by evidence 
about the relationship between influxes 
of refugees and terrorism. In Hungary, for 
example, where non-nationals represent 1.3 
percent of the total population, 72 percent 
have a negative opinion of Muslims, and 76 
percent believe that refugees pose a terrorist 
threat35. 
Second, perceptions of threats have been 
expanded into many facets of economic, 
political, and social life in the United 
States. Economic resentment, for example, 
has less to do with objective economic 
conditions than with negative perceptions 
of the economy. The unemployment rate 
declined from 9.9 percent in January 2010 
to 4.7 percent in December 2016; yet, 
during the presidential election, 44 percent 
of Americans believed that the job situation 
has worsened and 21 percent that it 
stayed about the same36. Among Brexit’s 
34. Glassner, B. (2010) The Culture of Fear: Why 
Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things, NY, 
Basic Books, p. 8. See also Furedi, F. (1997) The 
Culture of Fear: Risk-taking and the Morality of 
Low Expectation, London, Washington, Cassell. 
35. Pew Research Center (2016) Global Atti-
tudes, July 11. Available at http://www.pewglobal.
org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refu-
gees-common-in-eu/. Access November 11, 2017.
36. Pew Research Center (2016) A Divided and 
Pessimistic Electorate, op. cit., p. 4.
supporters, a growing gap emerged 
between the actual state of national 
economy and people’s evaluation of their 
own financial position. This trend provided 
a fertile ground for the “Leave” campaign 
– notably using deliberate falsehoods about 
the UK’s contribution to the EU. In turn, the 
“Remain” campaign multiplied predictions 
of economic disaster arising from leaving 
the EU as part of a “Project Fear”37.
This culture of fear subsequently 
transcends the traditional divides (the poor 
and wealthy, whites and non-whites, as 
well as native and foreign born people) by 
fueling “post-truth politics.” On both sides 
of the Atlantic, the traditional dichotomy 
between progressivism and orthodoxy 
has been fragmented in recent years into 
a multitude of sectarian attitudes based 
on alternative perceptions of existential 
threats. As Norris and Inglehart argued, 
“populism has a chameleon-like quality 
which can be and has been coopted by 
politicians of many different stripes and 
ideological persuasions”38. Yet, the most 
successful populist parties are those that 
combine in their rhetoric both material 
and cultural insecurities, as well as 
authoritarian values, resentment, social 
intolerance, and mobilizing anxieties.
A revanchist syndrome. Fear constitutes 
a fertile ground for revanchism. It denotes 
a revengeful sentiment, one that drives 
intolerant attitudes and policies aimed 
against those seen as posing a threat39. 
37. Perkins, A. (2016) “Osborne’s Punishment 
Budget is Restoking ProjectFear”, The Guard-
ian, June 15.
38. Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2017) “Cultural 
Backlash: Values and Voting for Populist Author-
itarian Parties in Europe”, Paper presented at the 
APSA Conference.
39. Smith, N. (1996) The New Urban Frontier. 
Gentrification and the Revanchist City, NY, 
Revista inteRnacional de Pensamiento Político - i ÉPoca - vol. 12 - 2017 - [189-200] - issn 1885-589X
199
There are left and right wing versions of 
revanchism, as well as complementary 
ethno-racial variations. All, however, 
include similar ingredients – a claim of as 
injustice, discrimination, deceit, suffering, 
resentment, and actual or perceived 
alienation. Defensive in-groups launch 
battles employing a strategy designed 
to delegitimize threatening out-groups. 
Revanchism often involves exclusivist urban 
policies (such as gentrification, school re-
segregation, and fight against “deviants”), 
and entails political maneuvering against 
minority groups (such as gerrymandering) 
and vulnerable populations (such as 
restrictive measures targeting food stamps 
users). Intolerant policies also involve 
various forms of “reverse discrimination,” 
as illustrated by legal battles in several states 
waged by whites claiming they are unfairly 
treated by affirmative action programs40. 
Intersectionality - originally conceived as 
a source of social empowerment through 
strength, community and tolerance - has 
been used by some movements as a 
rallying cry for exclusionary measures 
reinforcing harmful structures of race, 
class, and gender41.
The banality of violence. Both revanchism 
and the culture of fear induce the banality 
of symbolic and physical violence. As 
Pierre Ostiguy and Kenneth Roberts 
argued, “for all populisms, paraphrasing 
their discourse, power should be brought 
back to the authentic or ‘true’ people who 
Routledge.
40. Pincus, F. (2003) Reverse Discrimination: 
Dismantling the Myth, Boulder, London, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.
41. For the original purpose of intersectionality, 
see Crenshaw, K. (1991) “Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color”, Stanford Law Review, 
vol. 43, pp. 1241-1291.
are deemed to be ‘from here’”42. Most of 
them thus define “the people” in ethno-
nationalist terms – leading to violent verbal 
abuse against the “others”. According to 
the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 
American hate groups –and particularly 
anti-Muslim groups– are on the rise (from 
34 in 2015 to 101 in 2016) fueled in part 
by the recent presidential election. Trump 
had “electrified the radical right,” during 
his campaign rallies that were “filled with 
just as much anti-establishment vitriol as 
any extremist rally”43. Hate crimes are also 
on the rise. More than 6,100 incidents of 
hate crimes were reported in 2016, up from 
more than 5,800 in 2015. According to FBI 
data, hate crimes motivated by hatred of a 
religion increased last year, with a rise in 
the number of crimes targeting Jews and 
Muslims. Of the incidents spurred by hatred 
of a particular religion, anti-Semitism was 
again the leading cause, motivating about 
55 percent of those episodes, followed 
by anti-Muslim sentiment, which spurred 
about 25 percent44.
Similar trends are noticeable in Europe. 
Germany, for example, reported a 77 
percent increase in hate crimes between 
2014 and 2015. In Great Britain, hate 
crimes increased by 40 percent in 2016 
compared to 2015. The UN Committee 
on Eliminating Racial Discrimination 
attributed this increase to the “divisive, 
42. Ostiguy, P. and Roberts, K. (2016) “Putting 
Trump in Comparative Perspective: Populism 
and the Politicization of the Sociocultural Low”, 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. XXIII (1), 
p. 39.
43. Southern Poverty Law Center, Annual report 
2017. Available at https://www.splcenter.org/. 
Access September 24, 2017.
44. FBI, 2016 Hate Crime Statistics. Available at 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/topic-pages/
incidentsandoffenses. Access November 22, 2017.
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anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric” 
surrounding the Brexit referendum. Police 
data showed that about 82 percent of 
hate crimes were racially or religiously 
motivated, including ones related to anti-
Semitism and Islamophobia45.
4. What’s next?
Fortunes of populist parties vary. In some 
countries, they remain “niche players” 
but in others they either threaten to topple 
rivals in mainstream parties or rule the 
country. The most influential ones are 
those that combine an aggressive populist 
rhetoric with xenophobic sentiments. 
They flourish in the current context of 
“democracy of suspicion”46 whereby the 
norms of liberal democracy are subject 
to hostility on behalf of identity-based 
movements that express bitter grievances 
fueled by deep-rooted anger and insecurity. 
The root causes of the societal crisis that 
Western democracies are facing today are 
long term. They include growing socio-
economic inequalities – fuelling actual 
and perceived risks of social deprivation; 
prejudicial policies enhancing a sense 
of alienation; counter-reactions to liberal 
values – leading to social intolerance 
and resentment directed towards various 
scapegoats (from the elites to migrants 
and refugees). None of these issues will 
soon disappear. 
No one can foresee the end of the populist 
era, especially when considering the effects 
45. CERD, Concluding Observations. Available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Sha-
red%20Documents/GBR/CERD_C_GBR_CO_21-
23_24985_E.pdf. Access November 12, 2017.
46. Osborn, T. (2017) “What Thucydides Can 
Teach Us About Populism”, Working Paper n° 
01-17, University of Bristol.
of the transition to diversity, a process 
affecting both the United States and 
Europe. Indeed, multiethnic grievances 
and post-racial conflicts are exacerbated by 
this great transformation of the American 
societal fabric. Evidence about America’s 
demography vividly demonstrates that 
transition. The United States is becoming 
more racially and ethnically diverse, as the 
result of four factors: immigration flows, 
the growing propensity for intermarriage, 
the subsequent multiracial baby-boom, 
and thus the sharp increase in the number 
of people who identify themselves as 
“multiracial” (as measured by the U.S. 
Census since 2000). As a consequence, 
no single ethno-racial group will comprise 
a majority of the population in the decades 
ahead. This trend is already evident, as 
illustrated by the multiplication of inter- and 
intra-group conflicts based on “reactive 
identification” as various groups attempt 
to secure their respective position into 
mainstream society.
In Europe, those who fear that their 
country is already “swamped” by 
immigrants are even more militant when 
they envisage the future. They express 
concerns that low fertility rates combined 
with high immigration streams will lead to 
a significant increase in the culturally – if 
not ethno-racially – distinct population. The 
specter of the “great replacement”, raised 
by populists in most European countries, is 
gaining currency among policy leaders and 
public opinion. This suggests that European 
democracies will face further political 
disruptions and societal challenges. 
